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ABSTRACT

The 2010 Supreme Court decision in the case Citizens United v. FEC brought about
major changes in U.S. Campaign finance law, most infamously the creation and
proliferating of Super PACs, a new vehicle for outside spending. In this thesis, I
investigate the impacts of the Citizens United decision on electoral outcomes in U.S.
House of Representatives races. I analyzed campaign finance data from the 2006, 2014,
2016, and 2018 election cycles for three categories of House races: open seats,
competitive seats, and seats that fall within a specific spending ratio between the top two
vote getters. I conducted a number of comparisons of the winning percentages of
candidates with more PAC support (in individual races) and more outside support (in
individual races), between election cycles and seat categories. I also compared
incumbent-party winning percentages to PAC and outside-spending winning percentages,
to look for differences between the impact on incumbents and challengers. I found that
outside spending is more aligned with winning candidates in the competitive seats
categories than PAC spending. However, in the other categories there is no substantial
difference between PAC support and outside support. I also found that the Citizens
United decision appears to be helping challengers try to unseat incumbents by making it
easier to inject large sums of outside money into races. When two candidates are very
evenly matched, having more outside spending can help a challenger unseat an
incumbent, but if the incumbent has numerous factors favoring them, having more
outside support will not substantially help the challenger.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On January 21, 2010, the United States Supreme Court announced its decisions in one
of the most famous/infamous Supreme Court cases of the twenty-first century, Citizens
United v. Federal Elections Commission. At issue was the legality of independent
expenditures by corporations, labor unions, and nonprofits to attack or support political
candidates. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 placed restrictions on
corporations, labor unions, and nonprofits attacking or promoting candidates with
independent expenditures. The Citizens United organization sought an injunction against
the FEC from using the BCRA to stop the broadcasting of its film Hillary: The Movie.
The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, where, in a 5-4 decision, the Court held
that the First Amendment allows corporations, and presumably non-profits and labor
unions, to provide independent expenditures to promote or attack political candidates
without government restrictions. The Citizens United decision overturned previous
Supreme Court campaign finance regulation precedent, namely Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce and sections of McConnell v. FEC, redefining campaign finance
regulation in America.
The Citizens United decision has been contentiously debated ever since it was issued.
Some people applaud the decision as a victory for free speech. Others condemn the
decision as a threat to democracy, arguing that it will lead to unlimited campaign
contributions by corporations which will have a powerful (negative) impact on American
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politics. It is well known that in a congressional race the candidate with more financial
support wins much more often than the candidate with less financial support. Citizens
United opened the floodgates to money from corporations (and also labor unions, and
nonprofits) to be added to the political arena to pay for electioneering communications to
attack or promote political candidates.
What I investigate in my thesis is how the changes allowed by the Citizens United
decision affected electoral outcomes in House of Representatives races. In this thesis, I
analyze and compare campaign finance data from one election cycle before the Citizens
United decision (2006) to one election cycle after the Citizens United decision (2014). I
compare the success of U.S. House candidates with the most PAC support (in individual
U.S. House of Representatives races) to the success of U.S. House candidates with the
most Super PAC, 501 (c) nonprofits, and 527 group support (in individual U.S. House of
Representatives races), comparing 2006 to 2014. My thesis question is, in U.S. House of
Representatives races since the Citizens United decision, are the candidates with the most
Super PAC, 501 (c) nonprofits, and 527 groups support (in individual races) winning
more often than the candidates with the most traditional PAC funding in House of
Representatives races before the Citizens United decision.
Political Action Committees (PACs) are political organizations that raise money and
then give that money directly to candidates and party committees, or spend it on
independent expenditures. PACs often represent business, labor, or ideological interests.
There are limits on how much money a PAC can give to candidate committees, national
party committees, other PACs, and how much money they can receive from individuals,
party committees, and other PACs (opensecrets.org). The first PAC was formed in 1944
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by the Congress of Industrial Organizations to support Franklin D. Roosevelt’s reelection bid.
The Citizens United decision applied to SuperPACs (created not long after the
Citizens United decisions by the Speechnow.org v. FEC decision) 501 (c) organizations,
and 527 groups. Super PACs are organizations that can raise an unlimited amount of
money from corporations, unions, non profits, and individuals to spend on elections
advocating for or against candidates. Super PACs cannot donate directly to a campaign or
work with a campaign. The central differences between standard PACs and SuperPACs
are that Super PACs can receive unlimited funding from a particular source; however,
unlike standard PACs, Super PACs cannot contribute directly to or coordinate with
campaign committees in any way.
The second type of political organizations are 501 (c) groups, which are tax-exempt
non-profit organizations that can engage in varying degrees of political activity based on
the type. However, political activity cannot be the foremost activity of any type of 501 (c)
group. 501 (c) groups can receive unlimited donations from corporations, or individuals,
and do not have to disclose the source of their funding. 501 (c) nonprofits cannot work
with campaigns, and cannot expressly tell voters who to vote for. The most common type
of 501 (c) group is the 501 (c) (4) also called a “social welfare organization,” which can
engage in political activity as long as political activity is not its primary purpose (irs.gov).
The third type of political organizations are 527 groups, which are organizations
whose purpose is to influence political issues, candidate elections, policy debates, or
political appointments. 527 groups can raise unlimited amounts of money from
corporations, unions, and individuals, but they must disclose their contributors. Like
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Super PACs and 501 (c) s, 527 groups cannot coordinate with candidates or party
committees. 527 groups can be tax exempt if the follow IRS guidelines (irs.gov). The
data I analyzed for my thesis from the 2014 races is a combination of funds from Super
PACs, 501(c) nonprofits, and 527 groups.

Table 1
Political Organizations Table (NALC, 2015)

Source: Bloomberg Politics, July 31, 2015; Opensecrets.com: Center for Responsive Politics.

I chose the topic of campaign finance and more specifically Citizens United and how
it has impacted the electoral outcomes in House of Representatives races, because
campaign finance is a very important aspect of the American political system. Campaign
finance is important because political donors can have influence over politicians. It is
very expensive to run a political campaign for national office in the U.S. Campaigns are
constantly asking for donations.
According to the Center for Responsive Politics in 2016, the average amount of
money spent by a winning House of Representatives candidate was $1.3 million while the
average cost of a winning Senate candidate was $10.4 million (Kim, 2016). The $1.3
4

million and $10.4 million are only the amount spent by the campaigns, therefore those
numbers do not include outside spending form organizations like PACs, Super PACs etc.
The same is true of non campaign affiliated political groups like Super PACs, 501(c)
nonprofits, and 527 groups who are looking for funding to run advertisements for or
against certain candidates or issues. Super PACs can receive unlimited contributions from
a singular person or corporation. While not affiliated with a specific campaign,
candidates can find out who is supporting them through advertisements, which gives the
donors who write the large checks some influence. Additionally, Super PACs are often
run by former staffers (or even family members a candidate that they are supporting
(opensecrets.org, 2017).
The Citizens United decision changed campaign finance regulation in America,
leading to the proliferation of Super PACs (which were created by Speechnow.org v.
FEC decision). Super PACs have, in turn, led to a substantial increase in the amount of
money in politics and the amount of secret money in politics (Overby, 2012). In the
American republican system, the voters trust that politicians will represent their interests
in Washington, D.C. Yet, that is not always the case, because a donor can often be a
louder voice in a politician’s ear than their constituents. Donors can persuade politicians
to put their interests first, though it is important to note that there are plenty of situations
where the interest of the donor will coincide with the interests of the majority of
constituents. When/if the top donors are able to influence how politicians behave while in
office, democracy is weakened. A system in which politicians foremost represent the
interest of the highest bidder(s) sounds like an idea from a dystopian book or movie.
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The second reason that I am interested in campaign finance is that it is a behind-thescenes aspect of political campaigns. It takes a lot of money to run a political campaign,
but it is not a topic candidates like to discuss. Last summer, I had an internship with a
Senate campaign, it really opened my eyes to how expensive it can be to run a political
campaign. Even with scores of unpaid interns and volunteers, the costs quickly add up.
Candidates will often apologize for asking for money when asking for money. But
without funding, a candidate has very little chance of being able to successfully advertise
themselves to the voters.
The data analyzed in this thesis comes from the Federal Election Commission by way
of the Center for Responsive Politics. The data are from the 2006, 2014, 2016, and 2018
election cycles. I started with the data analysis with data from 2006 and 2014, and later
analyzed data from 2016 and 2018 upon recommendation from my thesis committee. I
chose the 2006 and 2014 election cycles because they are the two full election cycles
closest before and after the Citizens United decision without a presidential race. I
compare the PAC funds of the House of Representatives in 2006 to the Super PAC, 501
(c) organizations, and 527 groups (the data from these three types of groups are combined
into one category) for the 2014 House races. For the Literature Review chapter, I use
journal articles and book chapters have found on JSTOR and WPSA, along with reports
from nonprofits organizations, including: Center for Responsive Politics, Brennan Center,
Sunlight Foundation, Center for Public Integrity, Committee for Economic Development,
Bipartisan Policy Center.
The data analyzed are reported to the Federal Election Commission by candidate
campaigns, party committees, PACs, Super PACs, 501 (c) nonprofits, 527 groups etc…
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and then made available for public access by the FEC. The data are reported to FEC
because it is required by U.S. campaign finance regulations. U.S. campaign finance
regulations are an extensive set of laws that regulate the financial side of political
campaigns. Campaign finance laws cover three main areas. First, the raising of money by
campaigns and non campaign affiliated organizations to be spent on campaigns. Second,
the spending of money for and against campaigns. Third, the disclosure of funds to be
spent on campaigns (though the disclosure aspect does not apply to all organizations that
raise and spend money for political campaigns). There are two major pieces of campaign
finance regulation in the United States, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (plus
the 1974 amendments) and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (2002).
The passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act (1971) marked the beginning of
the modern era of campaign finance regulation in the United States. The Act regulates
campaign finance in a number of ways. First, its sets limits for the amount of money a
federal candidate or party committee can receive from an individual or a corporation, and
limits the amount that a individual or corporation can give in total (distributed over a
number of candidates and party committees) per election cycle. Second, the Act mandates
disclosure of contributions to, and expenditures by, candidates running for federal office.
Third, the Act placed bans on certain corporate and union contributions, speech and
expenditures (Jones, 2017). Fourth, the Act created the basic legislative framework for
Political Action Committees (PACs). Additionally, the Act gave the Justice Department
the authority to prosecute violations of it. In the first election cycle after its passage
(1972) there were 7,000 cases of violations of FECA referred to the Justice Department,
however only five cases were prosecuted (fec.gov).
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Following the Watergate Scandal, the FECA was amended in 1974. The Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 had five central sections: additional limits
on contributions to candidates in federal elections, provide matching funds for
presidential primaries, limits on the amount of speaking honorariums, stricter campaign
finance reporting and disclosure, creation of the Federal Election Commission
(fordlibrarymuseum.gov, 1974).
The second major piece of campaign finance legislation in United States history is the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (2002), which amended sections of the FECA. The
goal of the BCRA was to reduce the amount and influence of money in federal U.S.
elections, so that the voices of ordinary Americans could compete with large campaign
donors. The Act sought to accomplish this goal by placing limits on soft money being
used by political party committees for advertising (Strickland). Soft money is money that
goes to a political party committee rather than a specific candidate (Encyclopedia
Britannica, 2010). To make up for the lost funding caused by limits on soft money, the
contribution limits on hard money per individual were raised. Additionally, the Act
placed limits on the electioneering communications that included a federal candidate’s
name or image paid for by corporations, nonprofits, and labor unions (Cornell Law
School). However, these provisions of the BCRA proved controversial, on the grounds
that they infringed upon First Amendment rights. These amendments in particular, and
the controversy that surrounded them resurfaced in the Citizens United case.
The Federal Election Campaign Act (1971) and Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(2002) are the foundation for campaign finance legislation in America. These pieces of
legislation were not enacted on a whim, but they were carefully planned laws enacted to
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address a very real concern, corruption (and the appearance of corruption) in American
elections. This is why campaign finance matters, to remain a democracy, it is necessary
to have “clean” elections. Corrupted elections taint the whole system. Studying campaign
finance matters because it helps us determine whether these type of laws are working,
where there are loopholes that can be exploited, and if the laws go too far and
unjustifiably infringe on First Amendment rights.
Within the panoply of U.S. campaign finance court cases, Citizens United stands out,
because it opened the floodgates for larger sums of money than ever before to enter the
American political system in the form of independent expenditures. For decades the
Supreme Court had given the federal government broad discretion to enact campaign
finance reform legislation that regulated individual contributions to candidates and
political campaigns to prevent corruption and the appearance of corrupt. However, the
Supreme Court did not give the federal government broad discretion to enact campaign
finance reform legislation to regulate independent expenditures, because the Court had
held that limitations on those violated the First Amendment. Citizens United matters
because it severely limited the federal government's ability to regulate independent
expenditures, the result was a rapid proliferation of Super PACs.
This investigate the impact of the Citizens United decision on electoral outcomes in
U.S. House of Representatives races. In political races, having more financial support is
an advantage, and the candidate with more financial support often wins. In this thesis, I
investigate how the Citizens United decision may or may not have increased that
advantage. By analyzing data to compare traditional PAC to Super PAC support, I try to
determine the success of Super PACs as a means for channeling money into the
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American political system. The success of Super PACs compared to traditional PACs
shows an aspect of why the Citizens United decision is such a significant decision among
previous campaign finance Supreme Court decisions.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Supreme Court cases are remembered not only for the specific changes they make to
the U.S. legal code, but also for how the effects of those changes impact the country
overall. There is substantial literature on the topic of Citizens United and its impact on
campaign finance, addressing the issue from many different angles. This literature review
starts with a review of the major campaign finance court cases throughout U.S. history.
The rest is divided into six sections based on common themes I found in the available
literature on campaign finance. The six sections are: Citizens United: Citizens United’s
place among other Supreme Court campaign finance decisions, Citizens United is a threat
to democracy, Citizens United is a victory for free speech, Citizens United only had a
minimal impact, Citizens United and congressional races, Citizens United and the role of
incumbents.
Case Review
Many significant Supreme Court cases dealt with campaign finance throughout U.S.
history before Citizens United. Herein is a concise explanation of five campaign finance
Court cases that are important to understanding the impact (in terms of changes to
campaign finance law) of Citizens United, followed by a more detailed explanation of the
Citizens United case and the Supreme Court's decision. These five campaign finance
court cases that are important to understanding the changes the Citizens United decision
made to U.S. campaign finance law are: Buckley v. Valeo (1976); Austin v. Michigan
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Chamber of Commerce (1990); McConnell v. FEC (2003); Wisconsin Right to Life v.
FEC (2007); and SpeechNow.org v. FEC.
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 was enacted as an attempt to weed out
campaign corruption. The Act (and its 1974 amendments which were enacted in the wake
of the Watergate scandal) placed limits on: campaign contributions from individuals and
PACs, expenditures by candidates from their own personal funds, and independent
expenditures (ilsr.org, 2008). A group of individuals that included a senator, a
presidential candidate, and members of the ACLU sued, arguing that the amendments to
FECA were unconstitutional on the grounds that they violated the First Amendment's
freedom of speech and association clause. The case (Buckley v. Valeo) eventually reached
the Supreme Court. The Court held that the limits on individual and committee donations
to candidates were constitutional. However, limits on candidates spending their own
money on their campaign, limits on independent expenditures, and limits on total
campaign spending were unconstitutional (oyez.org). Buckley v. Valeo is a landmark
Supreme Court case regarding campaign finance because of the Court's ruling that the
government cannot put limits on independent expenditures, (spending money on behalf of
a candidate is considered free speech protected by the First Amendment), which has
resulted in the proliferation of political action committees.
The second campaign finance Court case of importance is Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce (1990). The Michigan Campaign Finance Act of 1979 barred
corporations from using general treasury funds for independent expenditures supporting
or opposing political candidates. The Michigan Chamber of commerce sued, arguing that
the MCFA violated its First Amendment rights (oyez.org). The case eventually reached
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the Supreme Court, and the Court ruled that the Act did not violate First Amendment
rights. The Court held that while the Act did place burdens on the Chamber of Commerce
and other corporations, the burdens were constitutionally justified because 1) the state of
Michigan had a compelling interest to maintain electoral integrity and 2) the Act was
narrowly tailored and implemented to achieve that goal (Katz & Vile, 2017). Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce became the foundation for state and federal campaign
finance regulations; however, it was overturned by the Citizens United decision in 2010.
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (2002) placed limits on soft money being used
by political party committees for advertising, and it placed limits on the electioneering
communications that included a federal candidate’s name or image, that were paid for by
corporations, nonprofits, and labor unions. Numerous lawsuits were filed again the
BCRA, and the suits were combined into one case named McConnell v. FEC (2003). The
lawsuits claimed that the Act’s limits on soft money and regulations of source, content,
and timing of political advertising violated the First Amendment (oyez.org). The Court
held that the government's legitimate interest to prevent corruption, and the appearance of
corruption of the electoral process by large financial contributions, allowed the federal
government to place limits on soft money and electioneering communications. The Court
therefore upheld the constitutionality of the contested provisions of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act (2002) (O’Neill).
In 2004, a nonprofit political advocacy organization named Wisconsin Right to Life
sued the Federal Election commission, claiming that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act (2002) provision that barred corporate funds from being used on political
advertisements within 60 days of an election was unconstitutional, because Wisconsin

13

Right to Life’s ads did not endorse or oppose a candidate (oyez.org). In its decisions for
the case Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC (2007) the Supreme Court held that the BCRA
provision, which barred corporate funds from being used on political advertisements
within 60 days of the election, was unconstitutional as applied to issue ads like Wisconsin
Right to Life’s. The majority maintained that there was a significant difference between
issue ads and express political advocacy, defining express political advocacy as an appeal
to vote for or against a specific candidate, while everything else falls under issue ads
(campaignlegal.org, 2015). The Court held that the government has a compelling state
interest to regulate the latter but not the former. The decision in Wisconsin Right to Life
v. FEC (2007) is considered to have virtually overturned sections of the McConnell v.
FEC (2003) decision. In McConnell v. FEC (2003), the Supreme Court upheld section
203 of the BCRA against a suit, but in Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC (2007), the Court
held that WRTL’s ad was not the functional equivalent of express advocacy. Therefore, it
did not fall under the jurisdiction of the BCRA. This created a loophole which bypassed
the McConnell v. FEC (2003) decision.
SpeechNow.org v. FEC did not reach the Supreme Court, but it is still a very
important piece of campaign finance court case history. In 2008, SpeechNow.org (a 527
organization) filed a challenge to the sections of the FECA that placed contribution limits
and disclosure requirements as applied to political committees that make only
independent expenditures in elections (campaignlegal.org, 2015). SpeechNow.org argued
that the contribution limits in the Act unconstitutionally violated the freedom of speech
clause of the First Amendment, and that the disclosure requirements were
unconstitutionally burdensome (fec.gov). In 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

14

District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the contribution limits were unconstitutional as
applied to individuals’ contributions to SpeechNow.org, but the Court ruled that the
disclosure requirements were constitutional as applied to SpeechNow.org (fec.gov).
Speechnow.org v. FEC forever remains in the shadow of Citizens United v. FEC, but the
two cases are significantly related. Citizens United dealt with the campaign finance
spending, while Speech Now.org dealt with the other side of the coin, raising campaign
funds.
In 2010, the U.S. court system heard another challenge to major sections of U.S.
campaign finance law. The Citizens United organization sued the FEC arguing that
sections of the BCRA infringed upon their First Amendment rights. Citizens United v.
FEC would eventually become one of the most famous (or infamous) Supreme Court
cases of the 21st century. The plaintiff in the case was a politically conservative 501 (c) 4
nonprofit organization named Citizens United. In 2008 the organization released a
documentary titled Hillary: The Movie. The organization planned to release the film to
video-on-demand services to cable TV subscribers thirty days before the start of the 2008
Democratic presidential primary election, and to advertise the film in TV commercials.
However, the BCRA had expanded the scope of the FECA’s (section 441b) ban on
corporate and union contributions in connection with political elections to include
electioneering communications, paid for with general treasury funds, and speech that
expressly advocates for or against a candidate. Section 203 of the BCRA defined
electioneering communication as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that
refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office and is made within 60 days
before a general election or 30 days before a primary election” (Duignan, 2019, p.2).
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The BCRA also expanded disclosure and disclaimer requirements. Section 311 of the
BCRA states “televised electioneering communications funded by anyone other than a
candidate for office must include a clear, readable disclaimer displayed on the screen for
at least four seconds. The disclaimer must identify the person or organization responsible
for the advertisement, that person or organization's address or website, and a statement
that the advertisement “is not authorized by any candidate or candidate's committee”
(Sullivan, 2010, p.2). To preempt the imposition of a penalty by the FEC, Citizens United
sought an injunction against the FEC in the the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia to prevent the application of BCRA against its film Hillary: The
Movie (oyez.org).
In its case for an injunction, Citizens United argued that section 203 of the BCRA
violates the First Amendment on its face when applied to Hillary: The Movie, because the
film did not constitute express advocacy for or against a candidate. The organization also
argued that section 311 (the donor disclosure section) was unconstitutional as applied to
Hillary: The Movie. The District Court denied the injunction, holding that Hillary: the
Movie was the functional equivalent of express advocacy, and therefore section 203 had
not been unconstitutionally applied. After the District Court denied the injunction, the
Citizens United organization appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted
a writ of certiorari and heard arguments in the case in March 2009 (campaignlegal.org,
2015).
The Supreme Court decided that it could not resolve the as applied challenge from
Citizens United, without setting a negative precedent for political speech. Instead, the
Court broadened the argument from Citizens United (which was quite narrow because it
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only focused specifically on Hillary: The Movie). This meant revisiting the Court’s
decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and sections of McConnell v.
FEC. The Court therefore, considered a facial challenge to sections 203 and 441b, and
applied strict scrutiny. This meant the government had to show that the sections in
question served a compelling interest and were narrowly tailored to meet that interest.
In January 2010 the Supreme Court announced its decision, holding that the First
Amendment allows corporations, non-profits, and labor unions to provide independent
expenditures to promote or attack political candidates, without government restrictions.
This decision overruled the Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce decision, and
overruled sections of the McConnell v. FEC decision. The Court held that the decision in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce interfered with the open marketplace of ideas
which is protected by the First Amendment. Since the majority believed that Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce was incorrectly decided, it was not persuaded by either
of the government’s arguments, anti-corruption and shareholder protection.
However, the Court ruled that the disclosure requirements of the BCRA were
constitutionally applied to the film, because the government has a legitimate interest to
provide transparency of funding sources to voters. While disclosure and disclaimer
requirements may create a slight burden for a speaker, they do not prevent anyone from
speaking. Additionally, the Court upheld the disclosure requirements for political
advertising funders, as well as the ban on direct contributions from corporations and
unions to candidates.
In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy said that all political speech is essential to
democracy, is does not matter if the source is a corporation. “Government may not
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suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity. No sufficient
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit
corporations” (Sullivan, 2010, p.3). Therefore (section 441b) the ban on corporate and
union contributions in connection with political elections to include electioneering
communications, paid for with general treasury funds, and speech that expressly
advocates for or against a candidate, was facially unconstitutional.
Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens stated that government regulation of corporate
involvement in elections is necessary to preserve the integrity of elections. The dissent
believed that the majority decision would greatly increase the influence of corporations
over the election process, stating that the ruling “threatens to undermine the integrity of
elected institutions across the Nation” (Hudson jr., p.3). Stevens argued that the majority
had blatantly disregarded the precedent of stare decisis, and had used question begging
and ad hoc arguments in the majority opinion. The result would “undoubtedly cripple the
ability of ordinary citizens, Congress, and the States to adopt even limited measures to
protect against corporate domination of the electoral process. Americans may be forgiven
if they do not feel the Court has advanced the cause of self-government today” (Duignan,
2019, p.7).
The strong views in both the majority opinion and the dissent set the stage for the
contentious debate over Citizens United among the American public. Public opinion on
campaign finance, and specifically the Citizens United decision, show the importance of
the issue to the American public, and therefore why it is an important topic to study. A
2004 study on public perceptions of corruption and money in politics by Persily and
Lammie concluded that “We must admit that large shares of the American population
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distrust their government and believe the campaign finance system is a source of undue
influence” (Persily & Lammie, p. 174).
A recent study by Dowling and Miller found that Americans view more positively a
candidate who receives a majority of their campaign contributions from individuals rather
than from interest groups (Dowling & Miller, 2016). An extensive survey by the New
York Times found that 84% of Americans believe that money has too much influence in
political campaigns, while 39% believed that the current campaign financing system
needed fundamental changes and 46% believe that it needs to be completely rebuilt
(nytimes.com, 2015). Additionally, 54% answered “no” to the question “Do you consider
money given to political candidates to be a form of free speech protected by the First
Amendment to the Constitution?” it is important to note that there was some divergence
along party lines in answers to this question; Republicans tended to agree with the
question while Democrat tended to disagree (nytimes.com, 2015).
These and many other studies show that campaign finance is considered an important
topic by Americans, there is concern about the current shape of the U.S. campaign
finance system. Many believe money has an undue influence on American elections. The
Citizens United decision has added to this concern by opening up a pathway for corporate
and union money to influence candidates and elections, which make the impacts of the
Citizens United decision an important topic to study.

Citizens United’s Place Among Other Supreme Court Campaign Finance Decisions
Citizens United is one of many significant Supreme Court cases that dealt with
campaign finance regulation throughout American history. To better understand the
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effects of Citizens United, it is important to examine what changes it made compared to
other Supreme Court campaign finance decisions. Campaign finance deregulation by the
Supreme Court began with Buckley v. Valeo in 1976 and continues today, most notably
with Citizens United v. FEC. Each major Supreme Court campaign finance decision is
integral to understanding the modern U.S. campaign finance system.
What stands out about the Citizens United decision compared to previous Supreme
Court campaign finance decision is the resulting proliferation of Super PACs (Dwyre,
2015).
In “The Deregulatory Moment?” Dwyre states, “The Citizens United and SpeechNow
decisions
and the FEC rulings to implement them led to the emergence of a new type of campaign
organization-the independent expenditure-only political committee, or Super PAC”
(Dwyre, 2015, p.45). A central aspect of campaign finance regulation is contributions
limits, but Super PACs became a new way to avoid those contribution limits. Former
FEC chairman Trevor Potter described Super PACs as “the clearest, easiest way to spend
unlimited funds on an election… pretty much the holy grail that people have been
looking for” (Dwyre, 2015, p.46). Super PACs are significant for many reasons,
especially the potential for corruption that is enabled by allowing them to accept
unlimited contributions. The first major piece of campaign finance regulation (FECA)
was enacted in 1971 to address campaign corruption.
However, the changes in U.S. campaign finance regulation resulting from the Citizens
United decision go beyond just the removal of the campaign finance restrictions which
led to the proliferation SuperPACs (Kang, 2012). A debate that began with the Buckley v.

20

Valeo decision was radically altered, because Citizens United “removed almost all
government regulation of campaign finance beyond transactions directly involving a
political party or candidate” (Kang, 2012, p.21). The reason the government enacts
campaign finance laws is to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption, and the
government had successfully used the anti-corruption interest to defend campaign finance
regulation from legal challenges for decades. However, the Citizens United decision
narrowed the government's ability to use the anti-corruption interest to defend campaign
finance regulations that do not involve funds going directly to candidates, i.e.
independent expenditures (Kang 2012).
In the Citizens United decision the Supreme Court narrowed the anti-corruption
interest. In Buckley v. Valeo the Court held that the corruption interest was not limited to
quid pro quo. Later decisions accepted an even more expansive definition of corruption
most notably Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (Abraham, 2010). The majority
defended this position by arguing “the fact that speakers may have influence over or
access to elected officials does not mean that such officials are corrupt” (Abraham, 2010,
p.1090). By shifting the definition of corruption (in the area of campaign finance) to
strictly quid pro quo (then holding bans on corporate independent expenditures as
unconstitutional), the Court was therefore rolling back man previous campaign finance
Supreme Court decisions.
Richard White adds, in “What Counts as Corruption” (2013), the Supreme Court's
decision in the Citizens United case attempted to oversimplify a complex issue that
America had been dealing with for centuries. “Struggle with corruption in the Gilded Age
resonates with combating modern financial and political corruption in the United States.
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It is ironic that their [the Court’s] increasingly complex understanding of corruption
should be reduced to Kennedy's primitive forms” (White, 2013, p.1054). Twentiethcentury campaign finance regulations were the culmination of decades of study of
corruption in American politics. It was deemed reasonable to limit some freedom of
speech to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption. Yet decades later, some of
those regulations would be undone by a Supreme Court majority that believed campaign
finance laws in certain areas were overly burdensome and a solution looking for a
problem. However, that lack of a problem is arguable because those campaign finance
regulations had been successful in reducing corruption in the American political system.
Citizens United is a Threat to Democracy
Immediately following the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC,
debate began over the decision and its possible effects. Many people believed that the
Citizens United decision was a threat to democracy, arguing that it would enable
corruption which would obstruct the will of the people. Former senator Russ Feingold
(co-sponsor of the BCRA) derided the Citizens United decision saying that it “gives a
green light to corporations to unleash their massive coffers on the political system”
(Kang, 2012, p.14). The decision has led to an influx in “dark money” in politics overall
(though Super PACs in particular do have to disclose donors) and without a contribution
cap, singular donors can fund a much larger percentage of a Super PAC’s operations than
of a PAC’s. In 2006, only two donors gave over one million dollars to an outside group,
but in 2014 that number jumped to 84 (Maguire, 2015).
The argument that the Citizens United decision is a threat to democracy has two parts.
First, based on electoral outcomes, and second based on the voting behavior of
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politicians. This thesis relates to the first part of the argument, for which I will investigate
how House of Representatives candidates who benefited the most from the result of the
Citizens United decision (through Super PACs, 501 C nonprofits, 527 group funding
support) are performing in House of Representatives races compared to candidates with
regular PAC support before the Citizens United decision comparing 2006 results to 2014
results.
An aspect of the concern over the Citizens United decision is that allowing unlimited
contributions to Super PACs increases the ability of a small subsection of donors to fund
a substantial percentage of a campaign for or against a candidate. Lioz and Kennedy
(2012) found that the vast majority of the money flowing to candidates, parties, Super
PACs, and other outside groups is coming from a tiny number of wealthy donors, either
individuals or corporations (Lioz & Kennedy, 2012). In 2012, for example, 68% of the
$828 million raised by Super PACs came from only 1% of Super PAC donors (Maguire,
2015). This issue of a small number of donors providing a significant chunk of all
funding has existed to some degree throughout U.S. history. However, with the
proliferation of Super PACs, which have no contribution limits, this issue has been
exacerbated.
As donors (particularly corporate donors) pour more and more money into supporting
campaigns in the post-Citizens United era, it is not surprising that they would expect
some influence in return for the millions they are donating to support campaigns.
Krumholz (2013) argues that the evidence that corporate donors are looking for influence
is that they donate to candidates on committees that interest them (Krumholz, 2013). For
example, the finance, insurance, and real estate sector (the largest private sector
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contributor to federal candidates and campaigns) give most of their donations to
candidates, PACs and SuperPACs of candidates who are on the Financial Services
committee (Krumholz, 2013). This is only one example, but it shows how the unlimited
corporate donations to support federal candidates can be intended to influence.
Evidence shows that corporations support Super PACs that support candidates on
committees that deal with the sector that corporation is in. (Krumholz, 2013) While the
Super PACs have no formal communication with candidate campaigns, instead using
their funds on independent expenditures, there is great concern that Super PACs and
candidates are not as independent as the Citizens United decision says they are. Kang
argues that independent expenditures are not as independent (from candidate campaigns)
as law says that should be. “They are made without formal coordination, but candidates
and those making the independent expenditures know whom the spending is intended to
benefit” (Kang, 2012, p.25). This creates a quasi-quid-pro-quo relationship. Since
contributions to Super PACs can be unlimited, the fear that corruption will manifest in
this relationship has become a strong concern of many who consider the Citizens United
decision as a threat to democracy.
In “Aligning Campaign Finance Law” Nicholas Stephanopoulos (2015) also writes
about a link between the policy decisions of politicians and the preferences of their
donors. Politicians tend to hold more extreme viewpoints in line with donors, rather than
more centrist viewpoints of the average American. “The ideal points of members of
Congress have almost exactly the same bimodal distribution as the ideal points of
individual contributors. They look nothing like the far more centrist distribution of the
public at large” (Stephanopoulos, 2015, p.1427). This type of link between the views of
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donors and politicians is seen as a cause for concern by many. This type of link could
have numerous impacts on American politics and the political system as a whole. In
particular, in relation to the Citizens United decision, as campaign finance regulations are
loosened in the name of free speech, the possibility of corruption from this link could
increase.
The concern of corruption is the heart of the argument that the Citizens United
decision is a threat to democracy. The government can regulate campaign finance to
prevent corruption, but the Citizens United decision narrowed the definition of corruption
in regard to campaign finance returning to a Buckley v. Valeo definition. Hasen points out
that changing the definition of corruption shows that a major aspect of the Citizens
United debate is over what constitutes corruption in regards to campaign finance (Hasen,
2011). The definition has been narrowed in the name of free speech, but many are
concerned that it has been narrowed too much. A narrow definition of corruption can
force the government to be reactive instead of proactive. As a result the federal
government will become forced to respond to corruption rather than using its full ability
to prevent corruption before it occurs.
The Citizens United decision in 2010 made it easier for corporations to enter the
political arena by holding that the First Amendment protects corporate donations to
political causes. In a democratic government, the elected officials are responsive to the
will of the electorate. When corporations enter the political arena by funding campaigns
that support certain candidates and attack others, there is concern that the voices of the
electorate will be drowned out by the multi-million dollar corporate “war chests.” In
“Expensive Speech Illegitimate Power” Zakaras (2013) argues that this situation is a
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serious cause for concern. He states, “Political speech authored by for-profit corporations
- including not just political advertising during campaign season, but political lobbying
year round - is often dangerous to democracy” (Zakaras, 2013, p.526). Clearly, large
corporate contributions can speak louder than the voices of the electorate. Giving the
corporate donors significant influence over the representative that “the people” cannot
match.

Citizens United is a Victory for Free Speech
On the other side of the debate over the Citizens United decision, many argue that the
decision was an important victory for free speech. Political speech is integral to a
democracy. Whether it is coming from an individual or a corporation, campaign finance
regulations that limit the amount that corporations can give to fund political campaigns is
a restriction on free speech. Supporters of the Citizens United decision contest or
downplay the possible negative effects of the decision that are promoted by those who
believe that the Citizens United decision is a threat to democracy. It is important to study
arguments in favor of the Citizens United decision to learn both sides of the debate over
the decision and the importance of free speech for all types of sources that fund political
campaigns. The impact of Super PAC funds on a candidate's chance of winning can show
how free speech (in terms of campaign funding) impacts the ability of a candidate to
successfully run a political campaign. Campaign funding helps candidates advertise
themselves to the public. On the other hand, campaign donation limits could potentially
burden a candidate’s ability to legitimately run for office, thereby blocking new
candidates and new ideas from being represented in political races.
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Many who support the Citizens United decision as a victory for free speech argue that
the decision is important not only for free speech and campaign finance regulations, but
also as a general First Amendment case. In “Citizens United and the Battle for Free
Speech in America” Simpson (2012) argues that in the twenty-first century, the First
Amendment came to be viewed as a tool to serve the goals of society rather than
individuals (Simpson, 2012). However, the Citizens United decision “returns to the
constitutional principle that the government must protect and not violate freedom of
speech” (Simpson, 2012, p.15). The Citizens United decision clearly outlines the breadth
of the First Amendment and shows how severe a situation must be for the government to
be allowed to limit free speech.
In “In Defense of Citizens United: Why Campaign Finance Reform Threatens
American Democracy” Hubbard and Kane (2013) argue that the Citizens United decision
was a good decision because it can potentially help break up the duopoly of the two-party
political system in the U.S. (Hubbard and Kane, 2013). They state that the enactment of
FECA coincided with a hyper-partisan divergence in Congress, because it gave greater
control over campaign funds to the political parties. The authors write “The changes in
campaign finance rules turned American politics into a classic case of monopolistic
competition, in which the Democrats and Republicans’ partisan duopoly was protected by
government regulation that diminished innovative policy ideas” (p.127). Hubbard and
Kane believe that the Citizens United decision allowed new voices to enter politics that
had been previously locked out by the duopoly held by the Democratic and Republican
parties. With new voices, American politics will hopefully represent the more diverse
voices of the American public.
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Like Hubbard and Kane, Bradley A. Smith (2015) also writes about the importance of
the Citizens United decision as an avenue to lessen the stranglehold of the two political
parties on American politics. While many opposed to the Citizens United decision decry
the resulting increase in outside spending as a threat to American democracy, Smith
argues that outside spending by a variety of interest groups is important to bring new
viewpoints that may be different from major party planks. He says, “Outside spending
simply means spending not controlled by candidates and political parties — spending by
the Humane Society, the National Association of Realtors, the Environmental Defense
Fund, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and similar groups. It is crucial for such citizen
organizations to speak out about candidates. Political discussion should not be
monopolized by politicians and political parties” (Smith, 2015, p.2). Citizens United has
therefore resulted in more speech, bringing new viewpoints, making it a victory for free
speech.

Citizens United Only Had a Minimal Impact
There are strong arguments on both sides of the debate over whether the Citizens
United decision has/will positively or negatively impact American democracy, but there
is also a third group who argue that the Citizens United decision in and of itself has had
only a minimal impact, because it is one in a long line of campaign finance deregulation
Supreme Court cases. To those who support this argument, Citizens United is a
controversial case because campaign finance has become over-politicized. The antidemocratic corporate takeover of American elections has become a rallying cry for some
grassroots political movements, as “perceived corporate dominance has spurred a recent
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populist backlash on both the political left and the political right… even if Citizens
United’s incremental impact is mild, it nevertheless has the feeling of a final straw”
(Levitt, 2010, p.217). Not surprisingly, there is plenty of literature about the disconnect
between perceived changes and actual changes of the Citizens United decision. Much of
what is seen to be drastic changes to campaign finance law made by the Citizens United
decision was chipped away at by a number of previous decisions, Wisconsin Right to Life
v. FEC in particular.
The literature about the Citizens United decision having only a minimal impact either
discusses changes made to the legal code compared to previous campaign finance cases,
or how those changes have only minimally affected elections so far. For example, In
“Can Rich Dudes Buy an Election?” Darrell West (2014) points to the fact that in 2012,
conservative mega donors used Super PACs to take advantage of changes made to
campaign finance law by the Citizens United decision to spend more money than ever
before to try to defeat Barack Obama, yet he still won. Obama’s ability to appeal to a
large swath of the American public and to mobilize those voters proved more effective
than the millions of dollars spent on TV ads by the Koch brothers, Karl Rove etc. . . .
Leading West to conclude that “Rich people can’t automatically buy American elections,
but money has a crucial impact on problem definition and campaign dialogue” (West,
2014, p.34). While this is only one example of one presidential race it points to the fact
that elections are much more complex than a handful of donor spending millions of dollar
to try to influence the outcome.
West discusses how the changes made by the Citizens United decision have only
minimally affected elections so far, using the 2012 presidential election as an example. In
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“The End of Campaign Finance Law” Michael Kang argues that much of the perceived
changes to American campaign finance law by the Citizens United decision had been
changed years earlier in a lesser known case, Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC. Much of
the concern over the Citizens United decision revolves around corporate spending on
elections, and how that spending would significantly increase as a result of the Citizens
United decision.
However, “the Court had already opened the door for what amounted to corporate
spending on campaign speech, in the form of so-called “sham issue advocacy,” a few
years earlier in a much less publicized decisions” (Kang, 2012, p.3). In Wisconsin Right
to Life v. FEC the Supreme Court narrowed the government's ability to restrict corporate
spending, allowing corporate spending on a variety of types of ads that support or
criticize candidates for federal office. In regard to corporate spending on issue ads, the
only change that the Citizens United decision made was allowing corporations to be more
explicit in their campaign advocacy (Kang, 2012).
Nate Persily, director of the Center for Law and Politics at Columbia Law School has
a similar view of the Citizens United decision and the changes (or lack thereof) it made to
U.S. campaign finance law. According to Persily, “Most critics of the decision will
suggest that the Court, with this decision, opened the floodgates to unlimited corporate
and union spending in next year’s and subsequent federal elections. The truth is that this
decision is the latest in a series of decisions (four, to be exact) from the Roberts Court
knocking down campaign finance laws. The floodgates, such as they are, were opened
three years ago in a different case, Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC” (Marx, 2010, p.3).
The significance of the Citizens United decision therefore lies in expanding the types of

30

advertisements protected by the First Amendment. Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC
protected ads that praised or criticized a federal candidate, the Citizens United decision
protected ads that directly endorsed a candidate or said “do not vote for…” a specific
candidate.

Citizens United and Congressional Races
Since the question of this thesis focuses on House of Representatives races, it is
important to study the literature about the Citizens United decision that focuses on how it
could (or could not) impact Congress both electoral outcomes and the behavior of
politicians. The Citizens United decision increased the amount of money spent on
congressional races (Kim, 2016). Studies have found that unlimited campaign
contribution allows singular donors to fund a larger percentage of a campaign. It has been
discussed at length whether these funds will impact the ways representatives vote.
Besides the data analysis, much of the literature on Citizens United and congressional
races focuses on specific examples of how the effects of the Citizens United decision
helped and influenced candidates. In “How Citizens United changed Politics and Shaped
the Tax Bill” Norden et, al. (2017) use the recent tax bill (The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act) as
an example of donors in the post - Citizens United era strongly influencing policy. When
asked about the prioritizing of the tax bill, Representative Chris Collins (R-NY) said,
“My donors are basically saying, ‘Get it done or don’t ever call me again.’” Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s former chief of staff Steven Law said, “[Donors]
would be mortified if we didn’t live up to what we’ve committed to on tax reform”
(Norden et, al., 2017, p.2). While on the other side of the equation, conservative donor
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Doug Deason told congressmen “We’re closing the checkbook until you get some things
done...Get Obamacare repealed and replaced, get tax reform passed…You control the
Senate. You control the House. You have the presidency. There's no reason you can't get
this done. Get it done and we'll open it back up” (Norden et, al., 2017, p.2). Similar to
how Citizens United allowed corporation funded political ads that more forcefully
support or condemn a candidate, politicians can be more open, and donors more forceful,
about the influence donors hold.
Norden et al. (2017) theorize that donors and politicians have become much more
open about this type of behavior since the Citizens United decision, because individual
donors can now contribute much larger sums of money than before Citizens United by
using Super PACs. This means that a “handful” of individual donors can now have a
much greater influence over a candidate/politician because they are able to be a much
larger percentage of a campaigns advertising. For example, before Citizens United, a
donor who gave $100,000 or more could represent 5% of all contributions, but now post
Citizens United a donor can represent 25% of all contributions (Norden et, al., 2017).
Another example of Citizens United affecting congressional races is Orrin Hatch's
2012 reelection campaign. In 2012, Hatch was facing a strong primary challenger, who
was supported by a Super PAC named FreedomWorks for America. In response to the
anti-Hatch ads funded by FreedomWorks, the pharmaceutical industry’s main lobbyist
group Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers of America gave $750,000 to a 501
(c) 4 “social welfare non-profit named Freedom Path that mainly supported Hatch in the
2012 election (Beckel, 2012). Hatch is on the Health, Education, Labor and Pensions
committee, which shows why the pharmaceutical industry supports him so strongly. This
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connection is an example of Krumholz’s argument that the evidence that corporate
donors are looking for influence is that they give to candidates on committees that
interest them (Krumholz, 2013).
In 2005 Brad Alexander published a study titled “Good Money and Bad Money: Do
Funding Sources Affect Electoral Outcomes?” Since this study is from 2005, it is not
about Super PACs, but Alexander does write at length about the impacts traditional PACs
have on electoral outcomes. Alexander found that traditional PAC support had a
significant impact on a candidate's chances of winning, “the higher the percentage of
donations a candidate accepts from PACs, the more likely they are to win” (Alexander,
2005, p.355). While traditional PACS are different than Super PACs, they are the
precursors to Super PACs. Super PACs can raise unlimited sums and use that money on
independent expenditures to strengthen a candidate's chance of winning even more,
whether in a reelection or as a challenger.

Citizens United and the Role of Incumbents
The incumbency advantage is the advantage that a candidate who is the current holder
of a seat has over the challenger. The incumbency advantage exists because incumbents
have better name recognition, more experienced campaign officials, previous campaign
outreach, and access to more financial resources (Landsman, 2017). The incumbency
advantage is relevant to this thesis because it can be difficult to distinguish between the
influence of campaign funds (as a result of a change in campaign finance regulations) and
the power of incumbency. Incumbency is an issue that I must be aware of when analyzing
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data because the incumbency advantage can easily be conflated with the effects of
additional campaign funds as a result of Citizens United.
There are many ways in which the incumbency advantage and the changes brought
about by Citizens United are linked. Heberlig & Larson (2012) write about the
relationship between independent expenditures and the success of incumbents in “Parties,
Incumbents, and Campaign Finance in American Elections” from 2012. With the Citizens
United decision expanding the amount of independent expenditures for express advocacy,
donors can more directly help candidates. Instead of giving money to party committees
which then decide how to use the money and what candidate to spend it on, donors can
give the money to Super PACs and 501Cs to directly impact the candidate they support.
“With a new spending option open to them, corporations could potentially shift their
political spending towards express advocacy rather than making PAC contributions to
incumbents (who can then redistribute those funds to the parties)” (Heberlig & Larson,
2012, p.57). This shift could allow more money to go directly to incumbents, thus
increasing their advantage, part of the financial resources aspect of the incumbency
advantage. While incumbents benefit from this change in campaign finance law, it is still
important to consider that some of the support is because of the preexisting incumbency
advantage.
In a second piece by Heberlig and Larson titled, “U.S. House Incumbent Fundraising
and Spending in a Post-Citizens United and Post-McCutcheon World” (2014), they
investigate the fundraising behavior of incumbents since the Citizens United decision.
Heberlig and Larson found that incumbents are concerned that Super PACs will help
challengers to unseat them, causing incumbents to increasing their fundraising efforts

34

(Heberlig and Larson, 2014). They write “The Supreme Court's rulings in Citizens United
and SpeechNow.org have the potential to increase electoral uncertainty for incumbents by
making it easier for unregulated groups to finance a campaign to defeat them. The threat
of such a campaign would motivate House members to raise more campaign money to
protect themselves” (Heberlig & Larson, 2014, p.2). Increasing fundraising efforts would
drive the cost of running a congressional race even higher than it already is, which would
mean more money in politics in general. Since house incumbents already have incredibly
high reelection rates, the additional outside spending from Super PACs could have a
serious impact either way, by solidifying the reflection opportunities of incumbents or
helping challengers win longshot campaigns.
In “Campaign Finance and Voter Welfare with Entrenched Incumbents” Scott
Ashworth (2006) also discusses the effects of the incumbency advantage combined with
easier access and influence over candidates. Loosening campaign finance regulation
means that donors can now fund a larger percentage of a campaign (Norden et, al., 2017).
Donors expect influence in return when the candidate wins, but the candidate must win
for the donor to gain influence, which “leads them to demand more favors from
candidates with less chance of winning, so incumbents have advantage in fundraising”
(Ashworth, 2006, p.64). When combined with the incumbency advantage, challengers
start at an even greater disadvantage making races less competitive. Therefore, the
weakened campaign finance regulations strengthen the incumbency advantage, in turn
making electoral outcomes a combination of the two, general incumbency advantage and
Super PAC funding of campaigns.
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Another important aspect of incumbency is that incumbents do not always need to
spend large sums of money to win, due to the many aspects of the incumbency
advantage. In “Measuring Campaign Spending Effects in U.S. House Elections” Gary
Jacobson (2006) finds that “heavy spending by incumbents is a sign of electoral
weakness, while heavy spending by challengers is a sign of electoral strength” (Jacobson,
2006, p.204). This also applies to other sort of funding on behalf of candidates PACs,
Super PACs, 501Cs, a donor(s) often will not see a need to spend large sums on a
particular candidate if that candidate does not face a serious challenge (Jacobson, 2006).
Since this thesis compares PAC support to Super PAC and 501 (c) support, and looking
at electoral outcomes, this is an important factor to consider since the incumbency
advantage helps candidates aside from outside funding.
The literature on Citizens United and its impact on campaign finance is substantial. I
have chosen a number of pieces for my literature from the six common themes I found
throughout the literature. The literature shows how important many believe the Citizens
United case to be. It is viewed both positively and negatively with strong arguments on
all sides. It has now been close to nine years since the decision, with congressional
elections every two years that means five elections since the decision was announced and
the changes to American campaign finance law were made. For my research, I used
campaign finance data for the 2006 and 2014 U.S. House of Representatives elections. I
compared the success of candidates with more PAC support (in individual races) to the
success of candidates with more Super PAC support (in individual races). This
comparison will determine if the rise of Super PACs resulting from the Citizens United
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decision has significantly impacted electoral outcomes compared to PACs, which were
key before the Citizens United decision and the subsequent proliferation of Super PACs.
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CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

In this thesis I investigated the impact of the Citizens United decision on electoral
outcomes in U.S. House of Representatives races, by comparing the success of candidates
with the most PAC support (in respective races) to the success of candidates with the
most outside spending support (Super PACs, 501 c nonprofit organizations, and 527
groups) in the 2006 and 2014 election cycles. The campaign finance data analyzed are
from the Federal Election Commission (FEC). Some of the data I accessed by-way-of the
Center for Responsive Politics, which had data organized in ways that were easier to
navigate. The FEC is an independent regulatory agency that enforces campaign finance
laws in the U.S. for federal elections. Federal campaign finance law has three distinct
areas: disclosure of funds raised and spent, restrictions on contributions and expenditures,
public financing of presidential campaigns (fec.gov). Data that candidates, party
committees, PACs, Super PACs et al. must disclose are sent to the FEC where they are
compiled and accessible to the public.
The data I analyzed in this thesis come from the 2006 and 2014 U.S. House of
Representatives election cycles. In the data analysis, I compared the success of House
candidates in 2006 who had the most traditional PAC support in their respective races, to
the success of House candidates in 2014 who had the most outside spending (Super PAC,
501 c, 527 group) support in their respective races. I investigated whether the candidate
with the most outside spending (Super PAC, 501 c, 527 group) support in respective
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races in 2014, won or lost more or less often than the candidates with the most traditional
PAC support in respective races in 2006. I chose 2006 and 2014 for my comparison
because they are the two full election cycles closest before and after the Citizens United
decision without a presidential race. I decided to not analyze data from election cycles
with a presidential race (2008 and 2012), because presidential elections can influence the
congressional campaign finance situation, and I am particularly interested in U.S. House
races. Since I am investigating the impact of the Citizens United decision on House of
Representatives electoral outcomes, comparing 2006 and 2014 provides a more
immediate impact, because those are the two election cycles closest before and after the
Citizens United decision without a presidential race.
For 2014, I used outside spending data for U.S. House of Representatives candidates.
Outside spending includes Super PACs, 501 c nonprofit organizations, and 527 groups.
The outside spending takes the form of independent expenditures, electioneering
communications, and communication costs (opensecrets.org). Super PACs are
organizations that can raise an unlimited amount of money from corporations, unions,
non profits, and individuals, to spend on elections advocating for or against candidates;
however, they cannot donate directly to a campaign or work with a campaign. 501 (c)
groups are tax-exempt non-profit organizations that can engage in varying degrees of
political activity based on the type, they can receive unlimited donations from
corporations, or individuals, and do not have to disclose the source of their funding. 527
groups are organizations whose purpose is to influence political issues, candidate
elections, policy debates, or political appointments, they can raise unlimited amounts of
money from corporations, unions, and individuals, but they must disclose their
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contributors. After the first round of data analysis my committee suggested that I also
analyze the three categories for PAC support in 2014 to see if this was a significant
change between 2006 and 2014.
For 2006, I used traditional PAC spending for U.S. House candidates. Traditional
PACs (Political Action Committees) are political organizations that raise money and then
give that money directly to candidates and party committees, or spend it on independent
expenditures. PACs often represent business, labor, or ideological interests. There are
limits on how much money a PAC can give to candidate committees, national party
committees, other PACs, and on how much money they can receive from individuals,
party committees, and other PACs (opensecrets.org). I chose to compare traditional PACs
to Super PACs, because the former are the precursor to Super PACs, and Super PACs
proliferated as a direct result of the Citizens United decision.
There are 435 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, and each is up for election
every two years. However, many of the races are not considered competitive, and there
are even some races where a candidate runs unopposed. In races that are not competitive,
it is unlikely that much money from traditional PACs, Super PACs, 501c, 527 groups will
be involved. Since my thesis focuses on spending from these organizations, it would not
make sense to analyze every race. Therefore, the data that I analyze are divided into three
categories: open seat races, competitive races, and races with a 7:1 and below spending
ratio between the two highest spending candidates. The competitive races are from the
Sabato Center for Politics at the University of Virginia. Each election cycle the Sabato
Center uses their political forecasting model to indicate certain races as competitive.
Though the races in the competitive seat category come from the Sabato Center, the
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campaign finance data that I analyze for each category comes from the Center for
Responsive Politics (outside spending) and FEC website (traditional PAC spending).
I chose open seats as the first category for races to analyze because open seat races
tend to have more money spent on them. Incumbency provides a significant advantage so
when there are no incumbents the races tend to be more competitive. Political parties
often see open seats as an opportunity to flip a seat. Open seats tend to be considered
more competitive than races with an incumbent, therefore, it is more likely that large
sums of money will be spent on the race by outside sources. Since my thesis focuses on
outside spending and potential changes from traditional PACs to Super PACs, 501c s,
and 527 groups, open seat races are a relevant category. In the open seat category there
were 31 races in 2006, and 42 races in 2014.
I chose competitive seats as the second category, because that cuts right to the core of
the types of races relevant to my analysis. The most competitive races are most likely to
have large sums of outside money spent on them. Having a category labeled competitive
directly cuts out all races considered noncompetitive and therefore unlikely to have much
outside spending, making them nearly irrelevant to my analysis. There are many
definitions for a competitive House race, but I chose to analyze the races considered
competitive by the Sabato Center, because they produced a list of House races they
considered competitive for both 2006 and 2014. The Sabato Center for Politics at the
University of Virginia studies and promotes civic engagement and political participation
(centerforpolitics.org). The Sabato Center’s ratings system is based on a number of
factors that include: electoral history, polling, candidate quality, modeling, reporting. In
the competitive seat category, there were 61 races in 2006, and 36 races in 2014.
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The third category is races with a 7:1 and below spending ratio. This category is much
larger than the first two categories, and there is some overlap with the first two
categories. The Center for Responsive Politics gives each House race a spending ratio
from 1:1 to 10:1, comparing the winner to the second-highest vote getter. My advisor and
I decided on a 7:1 limit, because that would provide a substantial amount of races to
analyze (many more than the first two categories), while removing the most lopsided
races. We decided on using a ratio as the parameter instead of races in which the top two
vote getters spent above a certain dollar amount, because a ratio gives a better picture of
the difference in spending of the top two vote getters. It is possible that there are races
where neither candidate spent a large amount of money and the race was very
competitive. This would be a situation where outside spending could have a significant
impact. In the 7:1 and below spending ratio category, there were 172 races in 2006, and
126 races in 2014.
A potential issue to be aware of when analyzing the data and writing the data analysis
chapter is that the incumbency advantage can easily be conflated with the effects of
additional funds, in this case, the result of the Citizens United decision. Politicians
running for reelection are known to have over their challengers, it is called the
incumbency advantage. The incumbency advantage exists because incumbents have
better name recognition, more experienced campaign officials, previous campaign
outreach, and access to more financial resources (landsman, 2017). The “access to more
financial resources” aspect of the incumbency advantage is especially relevant to my
thesis topic. Financial support is often a key to victory in U.S. House races, though
incumbency is also, and the two often go hand-in-hand. After the first round of data
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analysis, my committee suggested that I analyze the data for the 3:1 and below spending
ratio to see if there was a significant difference from the 7:1 and below spending ratio.
By dividing the data into three categories, I studied the impact of the changes caused
by the Citizens United decision in three different situations. Since one of the categories is
open seats there would be no incumbent in those races. Therefore, I could compare the
success of the candidates with the most Super PAC support (and the change from
traditional PAC to Super PAC from 2006 to 2014) in the open seat races category to the
other categories to see if a lack of an incumbent produces a significant difference.
While analyzing the data, I noticed that often when the candidate with less PAC
support or outside spending support won a race, the incumbent lost. I was curious about a
possible connection, so I determined the percentage of races in which the incumbent
political party (because some races were open seats) retained the seat. I did this for all
categories in 2006 and 2014, and for the competitive races in 2016 and 2018.
The focus of this thesis is comparing 2006 and 2014, however, in the second round of
data analysis, I analyzed some data from 2016 and 2018. My committee suggested that I
analyze competitive races from 2016 and 2018, to investigate whether or not the changes
I found in the 2014 data continued in 2016 and 2018. For both 2016 and 2018, I analyzed
competitive races, to determine what percentage of the races the candidate with more
outside support won. I only analyzed the competitive races in 2016 and 2018, because
outside spending appeared to have a more significant impact on competitive races than
the other categories.
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CHAPTER 4

DATA ANALYSIS

This thesis investigates the impact of the Supreme Court's Citizens United decision on
the electoral outcomes of U.S. House of Representatives races. The thesis question is, in
House of Representatives races since the Citizens United decision, are the candidates
with the most Super PAC, 501 (c) nonprofit, and 527 group support (in individual races)
winning more often than the candidates with the most traditional PAC funding in House
of Representatives races before the Citizens United decision, comparing 2006 to 2014?
The data analysis chapter is divided into five sections: Introduction, Results, Discussion,
Hypotheses, Limitations.

Introduction
The data that I analyzed are campaign finance data from the FEC, some of which I
accessed by-way-of the Center for Responsive Politics. I used total PAC support for
individual House of Representatives candidates for 2006 and 2014, total outside support
for individual House of Representatives candidates for 2014, 2016, and 2018, and official
election results reports from the FEC to determine the incumbent party winning
percentage in 2006, 2014, 2016, and 2018. The races are divided into three categories
(with some overlap): open seats, competitive seats, and spending ratio (as described in
my methodology chapter).
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I analyzed the data to address three questions: In what percentage of the races did the
candidate with more PAC support win? (2006 and 2014). In what percentage of the races
did the candidate with more outside support win? (2014, 2016, 2018). In what percentage
of the races did the incumbent party retain the seat? (2006, 2014, 2016, 2018).
What percentage of the races did the candidate with more PAC support win?
Since this thesis investigates the possible impacts of outside spending (Super PACs,
527s, 501 (c) s) on House of Representatives races, I needed data from before the
decision to compare the outside spending post Citizens United to. Traditional PACs are
the precursor to Super PACs, therefore, they are the best political organization to
compare Super PACs to. Comparing the results from outside spending post Citizens
United to traditional PAC spending pre Citizens United was the best way to complete a
before and after comparison. This comparison allows me to investigate how the change
from traditional PACs to Super PACs has impacted electoral outcomes by increasing,
decreasing, or keeping the same, the winning percentages for candidates with the most of
that type of support in individual races.
I also analyzed PAC support for 2014 to compare it with 2006 to see determine if
there was a significant change. While Super PACs were created and then proceeded to
proliferate in the wake of the Citizens United decision, traditional PACs still exist, but
they are no longer the “center of attention” in the campaign finance world. I determined
the winning percentage of the candidates with more PAC support for 2014 and compared
that to 2006 to investigate how the creation and proliferation of Super PACs may or may
not have impacted the use and effectiveness of traditional PACs.
What percentage of the races did the candidate with more outside support win?
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Since I am interested in the impacts of the Citizens United decision on electoral
outcomes, I decided upon the above question. Super PACs were created and then
proceeded to proliferate in the wake of the Citizens United decision, and Super PACs
make up a significant percentage of the total outside spending. Therefore, the above
question cuts directly to the impact of outside spending (especially Super PACs) on
electoral outcomes. Looking at the winning percentages of candidates with more outside
spending support provides an overview of the significant role outside spending can play
in races and how it compares to traditional PAC support (the primary option before the
Citizens United decision). While I started with only 2014, upon suggestion by the thesis
committee, I also analyzed the outside spending data to answer the question for 2016 and
2018, to see if the results were similar.
What percentage of the races did the incumbent party retain the seat?
This was not a question I initially planned to address in my data analysis. However, as
I was analyzing the data, I became curious about the relationship between the winning
percentage of candidates with more PAC and outside spending support, and the winning
percentage of the incumbent party (I chose incumbent party rather than just incumbent
because one category of data is open seats therefore there are no incumbents in this
category). I noticed that the incumbent party often retained the seat, whether or not they
had more PAC or outside spending support. But when the challenger won a seat, they
would almost always have more PAC or outside spending support. Therefore, I decided
to incorporate the above question into my data analysis as a way to see if there was a
direct relationship.
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Results
My data results made a 9x4 table with years and questions along the horizontal axis
and categories along the vertical axis. I have divided that table by category, question, and
year, creating a series of smaller tables which are listed below. First is open seats; second
is competitive seats; and third is based on spending ratio, which is divided into two
groups - 7:1 and below spending ratio and 3:1 and below spending ratio.

Open Seats
Table 2

Question 1

2006

2014

What percentage of the races did the candidate with
more PAC support win?

83.8% 87.8%

2016 2018

Table 3

Question 2

2006 2014

What percentage of the races did the candidate with more
outside support win?

2016 2018

68.3% 75%

80%

Table 4

Question 3

2006 2014

What percentage of the races did the incumbent party
retain the seat?

80%

2016 2018

85.7% 90%

74%

Competitive Seats
Table 5

Question 1

2006

2014 2016 2018

What percentage of the races did the candidate with more 60.6% 55%
PAC support win?
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Table 6

Question 2

2006 2014

What percentage of the races did the candidate with
more outside support win?

2016 2018

63.8% 55%

69.4%

Table 7

Question 3

2006

2014 2016 2018

What percentage of the races did the incumbent party
retain the seat?

55.7% 55% 74%

47.2%

Spending Ratio
7:1 and below
Table 8

Question 1

2006

2014

What percentage of the races did the candidate with
more PAC support win?

84.3% 87.8%

2016 2018

Table 9

Question 2

2006 2014

What percentage of the races did the candidate with
more outside support win?

2016

2018

62.7% 58.9% *

Table 10

Question 3

2006

What percentage of the races did the incumbent party
retain the seat?

83.1% 85.7% 88.4% *
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2014

2016

2018

Spending Ratio
3:1 and below
Table 11

Question 1

2006

2014

What percentage of the races did the candidate with
more PAC support win?

77.8% 83.8%

2016 2018

Table 12

Question 2

2006 2014 2016

What percentage of the races did the candidate with more
outside support win?

2018

64% 55.4% *

Table 13

Question 3

2006 2014

2016

2018

What percentage of the races did the incumbent party
retain the seat?

76% 84.8% 85.1% *

Discussion
My thesis question is, in House of Representatives races since the Citizens United
decision, are the candidates with the most Super PAC, 501 (c) nonprofits, and 527 groups
support (in individual races) winning more often than the candidates with the most
traditional PAC funding in House of Representatives races before the Citizens United
decision, comparing 2006 to 2014? I started by comparing PAC support in 2006 to
outside spending support in 2014.
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Table 14

2006

2014

What percentage of the races did
the candidate with more PAC
support win?

What percentage of the races did
the candidate with more outside
support win?

Open Seats

83.8%

68.3%

Competitive

60.6%

63.8%

7:1 and below
spending ratio

84.3%

62.7%

3:1 and below
spending ratio

77.8%

64%

I found that for open seats there was a 15.5 percentage point decrease, for competitive
seats there was a 3.2 percentage point increase, and for spending ratio 7:1 and below
there was a 21.6 percentage point decrease and 3:1 and below there was a 13.8
percentage point decrease. The results show outside support being less aligned than PAC
support in 2006 with electoral winners in House of Representatives for races in the open
seat and spending ratio categories. However, competitive seat winners were more aligned
with the candidate with more outside support (2014) than PAC support (2006). I
immediately noticed that in the open seat and spending ratio categories there was a
greater than ten percentage point decrease while there was an increase in the competitive
seat category. This trend appeared in many of the comparisons. I believe this is because
the competitive seat races are all truly competitive, while the races in the open seat and
spending ratio categories have significantly varying degrees of competitiveness.
I chose open seats as a category for my data analysis because I believed that open seat
races tended to be more competitive than races with an incumbent. I soon learned that
many open seats are not competitive in any way, and in many the incumbent party easily
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retains the seat, because in reality, many of the open seat races were districts where one
party had an overwhelming enrollment advantage over the other party. One aspect of the
results of this comparison that confirmed my expectations was that the percentages for
the 3:1 and below spending ratio group were less than the percentages for the 7:1 and
below spending ratio group. This trend continued throughout the data analysis, I had
expected it to be this way because the greater the variation in spending ratios, the less
competitive (on the whole) I expected races to be.
Comparing PAC support in 2006 to outside spending support in 2014 stands out
because it compares different questions in different years. However, the rest of the
comparisons are either: between years (but the same question), between the categories, or
different questions but within the same year. After completing the comparison of PAC
support in 2006 to outside spending support in 2014, my thesis committee suggested that
I compare PAC support in 2006 to PAC support in 2014 to see if there was a significant
change in the effectiveness of PAC support after the creation and proliferation of Super
PACs.

Table 15
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2006

2014

What percentage of the races
did the candidate with more
PAC support win?

What percentage of the races
did the candidate with more
PAC support win?

Open Seats

83.8%

87.8%

Competitive Seats

60.6%

55%

7:1 and below
spending ratio

84.3%

87.8%

3:1 and below
spending ratio

77.8%

83.%

The results show a slight percentage increase from 2006 to 2014 in open seat races
and spending ratio races; however, there is a percentage decrease for competitive seats.
This means that PAC support became slightly closer aligned with winning candidates in
2014 than 2006 in open seat races and spending ratio races, but less aligned in
competitive seat races. I believe this result is because outside spending (particularly
Super PACs) became the primary vehicle for independent expenditures for truly
competitive races. Therefore, the races that were left with lots of traditional PAC support
were most likely not at all competitive, leading to an increase in the success of candidates
with more PAC support. The winning percentage of candidate with more PAC support in
(truly) competitive races in 2014 decreased because the successful candidates in those
races were getting significant outside spending support. Again, the percentage
increase/decrease for competitive seats was the opposite of the other categories. My
speculation as to why that is the case is that the races in the competitive seats category
were all truly competitive, while the other categories have a mixture of races from very
competitive to not competitive at all.
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Table 15 is important because it looks at the potential changes in the alignment of
PAC support with winning candidates once Super PACs became an option for spending
large sums of money on political campaigns. Studying the changes in the percentage of
the races where the candidate with more PAC support won, gives a better understanding
of what types of races/candidates PAC support is going to post-Citizens United. The
results show that PAC support is less aligned with winning candidates in truly
competitive races, possibly meaning that
outside support is becoming the primary way to influence truly competitive races.
Table 16

2014

2014

What percentage of the races
did the candidate with more
PAC support win?

What percentage of the races did
the candidate with more outside
support win?

Open Seats

87.8%

68.3%

Competitive Seats

55%

63.8%

7:1 and below
spending ratio

87.8%

62.7%

3:1 and below
spending ratio

83.8%

64%

The table 16 results show a much greater winning percentage for candidate with more
PAC support than outside support in the open seats category and both spending ratio
categories. However for competitive seats, the candidates with more outside support had
a greater winning percentage than the candidates with more PAC support. I would
speculate that the reason for this is because traditional PAC support is going towards
races that are less competitive (the open seats and spending ratio categories included
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races that greatly vary in competitiveness). This results in a very high winning percentage
for candidates with more PAC support. While outside spending is being used by
organizations to support truly competitive rates because there are fewer regulations of
outside spending than traditional PACs. With outside support possibly being seen as a
more effective tool to help challengers than traditional PAC support, the result is lower
winning percentages in all four categories. For PAC support the percentages for all four
categories are very similar to the incumbent party winning percentage (those results are
listed in Table 18, right hand column). Overall, I believe that the key point is that in
competitive races that winning percentage of the candidates with more outside support is
greater (8.8 percentage points) than the candidates with more traditional PAC support.
Table 16 is important because it shows a comparison of PAC support to outside
support in the same election cycle. Looking at the alignment of PAC support and outside
support with winning candidates in the four categories, gives a side by side comparison
of their effectiveness in the post Citizens United era. The results are important because
they show again, that outside support is more aligned with winning candidates in truly
competitive races. It would be expected that the most competitive races would get the
most attention from a majority of large donors looking to influence electoral outcomes.
By showing that outside spending is more effective than traditional PAC support in those
races, the comparison shows how outside spending in the post Citizens United era can be
a powerful tool to influence U.S. House of Representative elections.
After completing the data analysis for 2014 outside spending I did the same for 2016
and 2018 to see if the results were similar or not. It is important to note that 2016 was a
presidential year which can impact the entire campaign finance picture for that election
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cycle and the 2018 election cycle had its own unique characteristics because it was the
midterm of a (deeply unpopular) president in his first term.

Table 17

2014

2016

2018

What percentage of
the races did the
candidate with more
outside support win?

What percentage of
the races did the
candidate with more
outside support win?

What percentage of
the races did the
candidate with more
outside support win?

Open Seats

68.3%

75%

80%

Competitive
Seats

63.8%

55%

69.4%

7:1 and below
spending ratio

62.7%

58.9%

*

3:1 and below
spending ratio

64%

55.4%

*

The table 17 results show percentage increases for open seats from 2014 to 2016 and
2016 to 2018, while there is a percentage decrease for all other categories. Although there
are only three years of data available, the results for open seats show an upward trend in
the winning percentage of the candidates with the most outside support (in individual
races). This represents an increasing alignment of outside spending with winning
candidates. I am curious as to whether or not that percentage will continue to rise,
decrease, or stay relatively similar over the next couple election cycles. For competitive
seats, it is interesting how the percentage decreases from 2014 to 2016 but then increase
from 2016 to 2018. I am perplexed as to why the percentage would decrease in 2016 but
then increase in 2018 (to an amount greater than 2016). The 2016 election cycle was a
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presidential election cycle, which could be a reason for way the results were so different
in 2016. If this is the case, will the percentage decrease again in 2020? Unfortunately
spending ratio data was not yet available for 2018, so I could only complete the data
analysis of the two spending ratio groups for 2014 and 2016. Both groups have slight
decreases from 2014 to 2016 similar to the competitive seats category. Again, 2016 being
a presidential election cycle could be a factor as to why the percentage decreases, but the
decrease is interesting considering the widespread use of Super PACs (and other forms of
outside spending) and the seemingly positive results for those entities in 2014.
One aspect of the results that stood out to me in particular was that percentages in
2014 and 2016 for competitive seats and the 3:1 and below spending ratio seats were very
similar. I think this is the case because there may be significant overlap between the
competitive seats category and the 3:1 and below spending ratio category. After the
competitive seats category I believe that the 3:1 and below spending ratio category would
be the second most competitive category.
Table 16 is important because it uses three years of outside spending data to look for
trends in outside spending in the post Citizens United era. Not only is it important to
investigate outside spending compared to traditional PAC spending, but looking for
trends in outside spending (for the three years of available data) gives a better picture of
the campaign finance situation post Citizens United. Finding a trend for the three years
post Citizens United, would strengthen the results of the comparison between traditional
PAC support and outside spending support. By showing an increase and then a decrease
in the winning percentage for candidates with the most outside spending in competitive
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races, the results show the importance of unique characteristic of election cycles to
influence electoral outcomes.
I became curious about the percentages of races (in the categories I was studying)
where the incumbent party retained the seat. I was interested in this because I noticed that
often when the incumbent lost, they had less outside spending support than the
challenger. I choose to look at incumbent party rather than strictly incumbent candidate
because one of the categories is open seats, therefore there are no incumbents in those
races.
Table 18

2006

2006

What percentage of the races did What percentage of the races
the candidate with more PAC
did the incumbent party retain
support win?
the seat?
Open Seats

83.8%

80%

Competitive Seats

60.6%

55.7%

7:1 and below
spending ratio

84.3%

83.1%

3:1 and below
spending ratio

77.8%

76%

In 2006 the results show only a slight difference between the winning percentage of
candidates with more PAC support and the incumbent party winning percentage, for
opens seats, competitive seats and both spending ratio groups. The winning percentage
for both PAC support and incumbent party are quite high in the open seat and spending
ratio categories. It is interesting to note that again the percentages for the competitive
seats were substantially less than the other categories. The incumbent party winning
percentage was substantially lower for competitive seats, this is not surprising since
57

competitive seats are often toss ups. The percentage of races where the candidate with
more PAC support won are significantly lower in the competitive seats category than the
other categories, I believe that is because there were many races where the incumbent
(party) had less PAC support and lost. I believe this is to be expected because overall the
incumbent usually has more PAC support (opensecrets.org) and usually wins the race
(opensecrets.org). In all categories the PAC support winning percentage and incumbent
party winning percentage are quite similar. For competitive seats, the PAC support
winning percentage is 4.9 percentage points greater than incumbent party winning
percentage, I would speculate that the difference (though not that exact number) represent
the challengers who had more PAC support and won.
Table 19

2014

2014

What percentage of the races did What percentage of the races
the candidate with more outside did the incumbent party retain
support win?
the seat?
Open Seats

68.3%

85.7%

Competitive Seats

63.8%

55%

7:1 and below
spending ratio

62.7%

85.7%

3:1 and below
spending ratio

64%

84.8%

In 2014 the results show that the incumbent party winning percentage remains very
high for races in the open seat and spending ratio categories. However, for competitive
seats the incumbent party winning percentage is barely above 50% (nearly the same as
2006). Again I believe this is because the races in the competitive seats category are truly
competitive, which would be expected to result in a larger percentage of challengers
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winning than in the other categories. It is interesting that the candidates with more
outside support had a greater winning percentage than the incumbent party in the
competitive seats categories. In the other categories the incumbent party had a very high
winning percentage, even though the winning percentage of candidates with the most
outside support is around twenty percentage points lower. For the open seat and
spending ratio categories, the incumbent party winning percentages were significantly
greater than the winning percentage of the candidates with more outside support. This
result shows that in those categories, incumbency is a greater indicator of success than
outside support. However, it is very likely that in most races the incumbent party
candidate had the most outside support.
Table 20

2016

2016

What percentage of the races
did the candidate with more
outside support win?

What percentage of the races
did the incumbent party retain
the seat?

Open Seats

75%

90%

Competitive Seats

55%

75%

7:1 and below
spending ratio

58.9%

88.4%

3:1 and below
spending ratio

55.4%

85.1%

In 2016 the incumbent party winning percentage is very similar to to the 2014
incumbent party winning percentage for the open seats category and both groups of the
spending ratio category. Again the incumbent party winning percentage is significantly
lower for the competitive seat races. However, the percentage has increased considerably
form 2014, leaving a significant disparity between the winning percentage of the
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candidates with more outside support than their opponents, and incumbent party winning
percentage. The open seats category has the greatest outside support winning percentage
and incumbent party winning percentage. Again, for the open seat and spending ratio
categories, the incumbent party winning percentage was significantly greater than the
winning percentage of the candidates with more outside support, showing that in those
categories incumbency is a greater indicator of success than outside support. However, it
is very likely that in many races the incumbent party candidate had the most outside
support. Interestingly, for the competitive seats category the incumbent party winning
percentage is much greater than the outside support winning percentage (this is very
different than 2014). The 20 percentage point difference for competitive seats really
stands out, it could potentially mean that in 2016 challengers had greater outside support
than their incumbent opponents more than in previous election cycles, yet were less
successful. There may be many reasons for the 20 percentage point difference for
competitive seats in 2016, it could possibly be the result of 2016 being a presidential
election, or a result of the individual characteristics of the competitive seat races in 2016.
Table 21

2018

2018

What percentage of the races What percentage of the races did
did the candidate with more the incumbent party retain the
outside support win?
seat?
Open Seats

80%

74%

Competitive Seats

69.4%

47.2%

7:1 and below
spending ratio
3:1 and below
spending ratio
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In 2018, for open seats both the outside support winning percentage and the
incumbent party winning percentage remain quite high. However, the outside support
winning percentage is greater than incumbent party winning percentage which is different
than 2014 and 2016. Again both percentages are significantly lower in the competitive
seats category, with the incumbent party winning percentage being exceptionally lower.
This may be because the 2018 midterms were the midterms in a president's first term
which is a time when the president's party often loses many seats in the House of
Representatives (McCarthy, 2017).
It is not surprising that a number of the seats flipped were considered competitive
seats, which would cause such a low incumbent party winning percentage in the 2018
competitive seat category. Because of the exceptionally low incumbent party winning
percentage (for competitive seats) the outside support winning percentage was over
twenty percentage points greater (nearly the opposite of 2016) showing that outside
support could have played a significant role in helping challengers get their message to
voters, contributing to their success. Unfortunately, for 2018 spending ratio data was not
yet available so I could not answer the two questions in the table.
Tables 17-20 are important because they look at similarities/differences between PAC
or outside support and incumbent party winning percentage. The goal was to see if there
were changes between the years and the within the categories. Financial support and
incumbency are both factors that strongly influence electoral outcomes. The results show
variance among years and categories, but the common theme is that competitive seats
stand out compared to open seat and spending ratio seats. This reinforces the trend from
among the many comparisons in this thesis that truly competitive seats should be looked
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at differently than the categories that included seats with a wide variety of
competitiveness.
Table 22

2006

2014

2016

2018

What
percentage of
the races did
the incumbent
party retain
the seat?

What
percentage of
the races did
the incumbent
party retain
the seat?

What
percentage of
the races did
the incumbent
party retain the
seat?

What
percentage of
the races did
the incumbent
party retain
the seat?

Average

Open Seats

80%

85.7%

90%

74%

82.4%

Competitive
Seats

55.7%

55%

75%

47.2%

58.2%

7:1 and
below
spending
ratio

83.1%

85.7%

88.4%

85.7%

3:1 and
below
spending
ratio

76%

84.8%

85.1%

81.9%

For the open seat and spending ratio categories there is an increase for incumbent
party winning percentage from 2006 to 2014 and 2014 to 2016. For competitive seats
there is a slight decrease from 2006 to 2014 and then a dramatic increase from 2014 to
2016. Overall, the competitive seat percentages are less than the open seat and spending
ratio races. Data were only available for open seats and competitive seats in 2018, for
which both decreased dramatically. As I wrote below the previous table, I would
speculate that the incumbent party winning percentages dropped dramatically in 2018
because it was the midterm of a president in their first term, which is an election cycle
where the president's party usually does poorly. While there is some up and down, the
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incumbent party winning percentage in competitive seat races remains far below that of
the other categories, implying that incumbency provides less of an advantage in those
races, and therefore outside spending support could have a greater impact.
Campaign finance is one of many aspects of American politics. In this thesis I
investigated the impact of the Citizens United Supreme Court decision on electoral
outcomes. Citizens United is one of a number of major campaign finance court decisions
(which I described in the introduction and literature review chapters), whose impact is
fiercely debated. My research looks at the possible impacts of the decision on strictly
U.S. House of Representatives races, which was narrowed to three categories: open seats,
competitive seats, and spending ratio (which was divided into two groups). I compared
the winning percentages of the candidates (in individual races) with the most PAC
support, to the candidates with the most outside spending support, from four election
cycles: 2006, 2014, 2016, 2018. I investigated the impact of outside spending in U.S.
House of Representatives compared to the role of traditional PAC support, so see if
outside spending was more aligned with winning candidates than traditional PAC
support.
I believe that the key point from my findings is that outside spending was more
aligned with winning candidates than PAC spending in the races in the competitive seats
category. However, there was no significant difference in winning percentage for the
open seats and spending ratio seats. The races in the competitive seats category were all
truly competitive, whereas the races in the other categories greatly varied. Therefore, the
outside spending was having an impact on electoral outcomes in those races that were
truly competitive. While the number of U.S. House of Representatives races each election
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that are truly competitive is small, they significantly affect the overall composition of the
U.S. House of Representatives, because most races are not competitive because one
candidate has a large advantage due to a number of factors. The ability of outside
spending to be a major factor in determining electoral results, makes Citizens United a
significant Supreme Court decision in shaping the role of money (specifically outside
spending ) in U.S. House of Representatives elections.
Hypotheses
After reviewing the results of the data analysis I formed two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1
Super PACs (and other forms of outside spending) make it easier to inject large
sums of money into U.S. House of Representatives races to support challengers;
however, incumbent party reelection rates in open seat races and spending ratio
races did not change substantially between 2006 and 2014.
There are a couple of reasons why I believe this to be the case. First, the changes made
to U.S. campaign finance law by the Citizens United decision (and the subsequent
creation and proliferation of Super PACs) reduced the barriers to spending large sums of
money on political campaigns. Since there is less regulation of Super PACs than other
political organizations like traditional PACs, Super PACs are seen as a better vehicle to
influence elections. There are many factors that influence and determine the outcome of
an election. Due to the incumbency advantage the incumbent will often be favored.
Which means that the challenger will need all the help they can get (especially financial)
to have a legitimate chance at winning. The creation and proliferation of Super PACs
brought about a new way (with minimal limitations) for donors to help challengers.
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The data results show a lower winning percentage for candidate with more outside
support in 2014 than PAC support in 2006, but incumbent party winning percentage is
relatively similar. This led me to believe that substantially more money was being spent
to support challengers in 2014, but their winning percentage was not much better than in
2006. The significant changes to U.S. campaign finance law, mainly the creation and
proliferation of Super PACs in 2014 which did not exist in 2006, means most of that
support was most likely going through Super PACs.
Hypothesis 2
In races that are truly competitive, having more outside spending support can give
a challenger a substantial boost, helping them unseat an incumbent. However, in
races that are not truly competitive having more outside support does not
substantially help a challenger unseat an incumbent.
Outside support matters most in races that are truly competitive. Comparing 2006 to
2014 (PAC support to outside spending) in the categories with races varying in
competitiveness (open seat and spending ratio categories) the candidates with more
outside support had lower winning percentages than PAC support in 2006 in respective
categories. However, the winning percentage increased in the competitive seats category.
As the saying goes “Money in politics does not matter until it matters.” In those
competitive races every last dollar of financial support can impact the race, making that
support all the more important. But in races that are either non-competitive or barely
competitive, after a certain point, each extra dollar has little impact on the electoral
outcome of the race. In some situations one candidate may have such an advantage that
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no matter how much financial support the disadvantaged candidate gets they still have no
chance of winning.
There are many factors that influence the outcome of an election. If a candidate only
has the advantage of the outside support factor, while the other candidate has the
advantage in numerous factors (incumbency, name recognition, party enrollment totals
etc…) than having an advantage in outside support will not significantly increase that
candidate’s chances of winning (if at all). However, in truly competitive races, where the
candidates are relatively even in terms of advantages in factors that influence elections,
then having more outside spending can increase a candidate's chances of winning, more
than having the most traditional PAC support.
Limitations
In this final section of the data analysis chapter I will outline limitations and
weaknesses of my research, and unexpected results. The major limitation/weakness is
that the data analysis was all done by hand. I am not knowledgeable in any type of
statistical data analysis process, therefore it was all done by hand. This has multiple
consequences, foremost human error in the transferring of data and calculations.
Additionally, the lack of spending ratio data for 2018, meant that I could not see if there
was any trend for more than two years in that category.
The main unexpected result is that I thought open seats would be competitive, this is
one reason why I chose that as one of the categories for my data analysis. But I learned
that open seats greatly vary in their competitiveness, some are truly competitive, some
are not competitive, and most are somewhere in the middle (Frazier, 2018). I expected
the lack of an incumbent to be a major factor that would make these races competitive,
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however, I learned that many of the open seats were districts that were never competitive
due to party breakdown of voter enrollment, therefore the incumbent party could easily
retain the seat (Gonzales, 2013). The growing number of U.S. House of Representatives
races that lack competitiveness is written about by Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning,
in a 2006 study titled Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S.
House Elections. They found that U.S. House of Representatives races are becoming less
competitive overall because of internal migration, immigration, and ideological
realignment. “Democratic districts have become more Democratic, Republican districts
have become more Republican, and marginal districts have been disappearing as a result
of powerful forces at work in American society” (Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning,
2006, p.77).
Another unexpected result was that the winning percentage of the candidate with more
outside support in competitive seat races decreased in 2016 but then dramatically
increased in 2018 (to a percentage greater than 2014). It is possible that was a result of
2016 being a presidential election cycle, therefore it would be interesting to see what
happens in 2020. Those
results really stood out to me, and I am confused as to what caused them.
In my Data Analysis chapter I presented my results, and then discussed the results
through comparisons. The comparisons are organized by year, question, or category. In
most of the comparisons the open seats, and both spending ratio categories had similar
results, while the competitive seats results were different. I believe this is because the
open seats and spending ratio categories included races that greatly vary in their
competitiveness, while the competitive seats category races are all truly competitive. In
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the comparison between PAC support and outside support, the winning percentage would
be greater for PAC support than outside support in the open seats and spending ratio
categories, but greater for outside support in the competitive seats. For each comparison I
discuss the results, importance, of the results, speculate about the results, and describe
any unique characteristic of that particular election cycle. The discussion of the results
leads to my two hypotheses, about outside spending helping challengers, and the ability
of outside spending to play a crucial role in truly competitive races but being less
effective in races where one candidate already has an overwhelming advantage. I finished
the chapter with a discussion of limitations, weakness, and unexpected results.
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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

In this thesis I investigated the impact of the Citizens United Supreme Court decision
on electoral outcomes in U.S. House of Representatives races. My thesis question was, in
House of Representatives races since the Citizens United decision, are the candidates
with the most Super PAC, 501 (c) nonprofits, and 527 groups support (in individual
races) winning more often than the candidates with the most traditional PAC funding in
House of Representatives races before the Citizens United decision, comparing 2006 to
2014?
I choose the topic of campaign finance and Citizens United because I am interested in
the role that money plays in American elections. The Citizens United decision stands out
because of the resulting creation and proliferation of Super PACs that allowed large sums
of money to be injected into U.S. elections in support of and in opposition to, candidates
and issues. Large donors can often have some degree of influence over politicians.
Though Super PACs are not affiliated with a campaign, it is not difficult for candidates to
find out who is financing advertisements for them or against their opponents. In some
cases, Super PACs are run by former staffers (or even family members) of a candidate
that they are supporting (opensecrets.org, 2017).
I analyzed campaign finance data to answer three questions: What percentage of the
races did the candidate with more PAC support win? What percentage of the races did the
candidate with more outside support win? What percentage of the races did the
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incumbent party retain the seat? There were three categories of House races: open seat
races, competitive races, and spending ratio races. The goal was to investigate a possible
change in winning percentage from PAC support to outside spending support, by
comparing the winning percentages from candidates with
the most PAC support to candidates with the most outside support.
The results from the data analysis were different for the competitive seat races than
the open seat races and spending ratio races. This is because the competitive seat races
were all truly competitive, while the other two categories were made up of seats varying
in competitiveness. When comparing PAC support in 2006 to outside support in 2014,
the results showed that in the competitive races the candidates with more outside support
did win more than the candidates with more traditional PAC support, however, for the
other categories there was actually a decrease in winning percentage. The comparison of
PAC support in 2006 to PAC support in 2014 showed that in competitive races PAC
support was less aligned with winning candidates, but more aligned in the other
categories. Comparing 2014 PAC and outside support showed that outside support was
more aligned with winning candidate than PAC support in competitive races, but the
opposite was true in the other categories. The overall trend of outside support (2014,
2016, 2018) was an increase in winning percentage in open seats, while decreasing and
then increasing in competitive seats. There were very mixed results for the incumbent
party winning percentage comparisons. In some cases, the outside spending winning
percentage was greater than the incumbent party winning percentage, but in other cases it
was the opposite. The results really varied depending on the category and the year.
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To address my thesis question, I believe the best answer from the data analysis results
is that in truly competitive races the candidates with more outside support have a greater
winning percentage than the candidates with more traditional PAC support, in midterm
elections (2014 and 2018). In 2016 the winning percentage for candidates with the most
outside support was actually lower than PAC support in 2006, it is possible that 2016 is
different because it was a presidential election. In open seat races and spending ratio
races however, there was no significant change in winning percentage.
The results led me to form two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is about the ability of
outside spending to benefit challengers more so than incumbents. Incumbents almost
always have large financial “war chest.” However, the deregulated nature of outside
spending (particularly Super PACs) may benefit challengers by allowing large sums of
money from various organizations or donors to be spent in support of challengers,
improving their chance of success on election day. The second hypothesis is about the
effect of having more outside support than an opponent. Having more outside support can
help a challenger unseat an incumbent, more so than having more traditional PAC
support, but only in truly competitive races. In races that are not truly competitive having
the advantage in only the outside spending factor does not provide a substantial boost. In
races in which both candidates are evenly matched, having more outside support can
increase a challenger’s chances of winning the race. Both hypotheses point to ways in
which the Citizens United decision can impact electoral outcomes in U.S. House of
Representative races.
Since it is very expensive to run federal political campaigns in the U.S., campaign
finance play a major role in the overall election process. The larger funders can have
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influence over politicians. The Citizens United Supreme Court decision stands out
because it held that the First Amendment allows corporations, non-profits, and labor
unions, to provide independent expenditures to promote or attack political candidates,
without government restrictions, thus effectively overturning a number of previous
campaign finance Supreme Court rulings. The impact of the resulting creation and
proliferation of Super PACs (which can raise an unlimited amount of money from
corporations, unions, non-profits, and individuals) to spend on
elections advocating for or against candidates, is what I investigated in this thesis.
My data analysis results show the potential impact of the Citizens United decision on
U.S. House of Representatives races. The increase in the winning percentage of
candidates with the most PAC support compared to most outside spending support (but
only in competitive races) shows that the Citizens United decision appears to have in
some ways had an impact on electoral outcomes in U.S. House of representative races.
By impacting actual electoral outcomes the Citizens United decision appears to have
increased the strength and influence of outside spending on elections. The outside
spending that goes through Super PACs is often large contributions from individuals,
corporations, or labor unions. This means that these organization may gain more
influence in American politics. The ability of political donors to gain influence over
politicians leading to corruption, was one reason for the implementation of an extensive
set of campaign finance regulations in the U.S., in the first place.
The so what question asks why is my thesis important. It is important because it
investigates how a major Supreme Court campaign finance decision can impact elections
across the country. These are House of Representatives elections, sending members to the
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House that will write policy that affects Americans across the country. Therefore,
changing campaign finance law can cause a chain reaction impacting all aspects of the
American political system. To investigate how the changes brought about by the Citizens
United decision may be having real impacts on electoral outcomes is important because
its looks at how Supreme Court campaign finance decisions can impact elections, in turn
affecting the outcomes of those elections.
After reviewing my data analysis process and the results I found a number of
directions for future research, questions unanswered, and big picture questions.
Directions for future research include more specific data analysis questions. For example,
in Tables 16-20 I compare the results from two questions, PAC support and outside
spending support to incumbent party winning percentage. Those questions could be
combined, to find the success of incumbent party candidates with the most PAC support
or outside spending support. Combining the questions to create a more specific category
of races could be a way to more clearly determine the success of those incumbent party
candidates with more PAC support or more outside support. The same could be done
with challengers to see how challengers with more outside support or PAC support
compared to challengers with less of that kind of support than their incumbent opponent.
Another direction for future research would be using different House race categories. I
used three categories: open seats, competitive, and spending ratio (which was broken into
two groups, 7:1 and below and 3:1 and below). First, the spending ratio could be
narrowed to 2:1 or even 1:1, the narrower the category gets the more competitive the
races would be expected to be. In my data analysis the results showed the most impact on
the competitive seats races, therefore narrowing the spending ratio category would be a
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different way to create a category of predominantly competitive races. Additionally, other
categories would include political affiliation. Looking at the political parties separately
could be used to investigate the relationship of each political party with PAC and outside
spending, and to see their success at holding and/or flipping seats based on outside
spending.
A different direction for future research would be using data from future elections. In
certain parts of the data analysis, the results were much different in 2016. I speculated
that this could be because 2016 was a presidential election cycle, while all the other
election cycles I analyzed were midterms. The 2020 elections are looming on the horizon,
which will be a presidential year. It would be interesting to see if the results for 2020
would be similar to 2016, if so, that would put more weight behind the speculation that
presidential elections impact electoral outcomes in regard to outside spending differently
than midterm elections. Alternatively, the 2020 results might not be similar to 2016, but
could still be very different from the midterm election cycles studied. Studying future
elections would help to solidify trends in the data results, or if results varied, would show
how the unique characteristic of each election cycle impacts the spending which can in
turn impact electoral outcomes.
I end this conclusion chapter, and therefore my thesis, with some big picture questions
about campaign finance and Citizens United in relation to my thesis. First, did the
Citizens United decision really help challengers? Future research could more closely
investigate this question. Second, what could be the role of outside spending in the 2020
election? It will be interesting to see data from the 2020 election cycle on outside
spending and winning candidates. Third, while the Citizens United decision appears to
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have helped challengers who are already competitive, what are the prospects for it to
increase the number of competitive races, through boosting challenger’s chances of
winning? Fourth, how does the impact of outside spending compare to unique electoral
characteristics? The are many factors that impact electoral outcomes, with outside
spending being just one factor, and different factors can be more important in different
election cycles. Fifth, will there be congressional action to address outside spending and
the Citizens United decision? There is a substantial amount of discontent over the amount
of outside spending in U.S. elections by the public, but so far there does not seem to be
much concern in Congress. Sixth, Could outside spending play a greater role in less
competitive races in the future? All of these questions could lead to future research. But
for now the Citizens United decision will remain to some degree an influencing factor in
U.S. House of Representatives races. The extent of the impact of the Citizens United
decision will continue to be researched and investigated.
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